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23 FEB 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR CIA MEMBER UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Requirements for Present Satellite  
Image-Forming Sensors

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-41.14/213 (COMOR-D-13/29) dated 14 December 1964  
b. USIB-D-41.14/214 (COMOR-D-13/30) dated 30 December 1964  
c. USIB-D-41.14/216 (COMOR-D-13/35) dated 15 February 1965

1. This is a briefing memorandum on this subject which is scheduled for consideration by USIB at its 25 February meeting.

2. Reference a., COMOR's previous attempt to state long-term requirements for satellite image-forming sensors, was considered but not approved by USIB on 23 December. As indicated in reference b., the Board agreed at that time that COMOR should divide the subject into two separate papers, one relating to the use of currently available photo-satellite capabilities, the other on needs for new systems. Reference c., is the first of these papers to be completed by COMOR; the second paper will be forwarded to USIB at a later date.

3. The Board's principal concern with the earlier COMOR document was that USIB long-term requirements guidance to NRO should be realistic and flexible. In our view, these elements have been successfully infused into the new paper by emphasizing that:

a. Long-term requirements are estimative in nature and intended only for general planning and programming purposes over a relatively long period ahead. This concept applies also to the numbers and types of targets as well as the frequencies of coverage which are outlined in TAB A.

b. These long-term requirements will be supplemented by other guidance which reflects changing intelligence needs arising out of continuously shifting world situations. Moreover, specific scheduling and targetting guidance, based on a continuing review of intelligence problems and other relevant factors, will be provided for each mission.

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DIA review(s) completed.


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
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c. We recognize that existing photo-satellite capabilities may not completely fulfill the presently-stated requirements for either area or target coverage.

4. We tried in COMOR to inject some further realism and flexibility into TAB A. We proposed to DIA that the periodicity for target coverage listed in that TAB should be specified in broader terms, i.e., "one to two months" instead of monthly, every "two to three months" vice every two months, etc. DIA reported, however, that in response to the Board's request it had reviewed the frequency of coverage problem in light of the substantial CIA dissent in the earlier paper, but could make no change. It will be noted, therefore, that we reiterate our view in paragraph 2 of TAB A (page 15) that most of the target categories listed do not require coverage as frequently as specified. The second sentence is a matter of principle. We believe that it is unreasonable to request photography of any objective as frequently as every month, although this may occasionally be necessary. (DOD is asking for monthly coverage of four electronics installations plus a percentage of sites at the missile test ranges.)

5. As you will recall, COMOR was silent in reference a. about the probable number of KH-4 missions which should be planned to meet the community's requirements. That deficiency is corrected by the COMOR conclusion in paragraph 6 (page 6) that the planned frequency should be for two successful KH-4 buckets each month. In our view, this will provide more coverage than the community requires, even for base-line purposes. We believe, therefore, that a reasonable increase in intelligence needs, including mapping and charting, can be accommodated within the presently planned frequency.



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
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8. Our major problem with the paper concerns both the substance of the mapping, charting, and geodesy section and its length which distorts the true purpose of the paper. The footnotes on pages 9, 11, and 12 explain our dissenting views.

9. Recommendation: It is recommended that you concur in the COMOR paper generally, but support the CIA views in paragraph 2 of TAB A (page 15) and our footnotes on pages 9, 11, 12 and 14.



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RAY S. CLINE  
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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